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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SOME INFLUENCES OF JUSTICE HOLMES' THOUGHT ON
CURRENT LAW-EVIDENCE
By
PERLIE P. FALLON*

Justice Holmes, dissenting, in Donnelly v. United States' stated that the rules

of evidence are in the main based on experience, logic and common sense, and
they are less hampered by historical development than some parts of the substantive law.
I classify the opinions that I discuss here under two headings, namely, (1)
The scope of the enquiry and, (2) The rules respecting presumptions. My purpose
does not include a study of the rules of evidence. My objective is much narrower, namely, to bring together some of Justice Holmes' opinions on evidence.
I shall relate Justice Holmes' thought to the present by using as a current standard
the Model Code of Evidence. I shall refer to some recent cases. Justice Holmes'
thought creates its own sparks of energy.
The grouping of the cases is an exercise of discretion in order to secure form and
arrangement. The two cases that I place in the scope of the enquiry are usually classified under hearsay and self-serving declarations.
Those of us who have been trained in the common law are case minded. We
look for a case that controls the problem we have at hand. Lately precedents have
lost some of their value; stare decisis is not what it once was. The idea that the
immediate is in a state of flux is old. The Roman praetor,in order to obtain a flexibility which life itself made necessary, used a case system of approach to the law.
In Justice Holmes' work there is a practical analysis behind short opinions. The
factual background upon which the law rests creates varying shades. The sensitiveness of Justice Holmes to attendant facts is part of his grandeur. Our age, and
a large part of Justice Holmes' 'era, is and were periods of technological expansion.
Machines have functions that are adapted to use. This thinking invades the law
since the law rests upon life. Form does not play so great a part when function
dominates and at times form must struggle to find even a place. The Roman praetors
and those who devised our case system had an understanding of inherent change.
Justice Holmes is always aware that cases must be dealt with on their facts. He
finds the inspiration of the law in the facts. There is another pole in the method
that Justice Holmes uses. It is thought in the more abstract sense. That is the safeguard against confusion. We find it in the continual seeking for analogies from
fields of the law other than that in which he is working at the moment. This sense
*A.B., Clark University; LL.B., Columbia University; Member of the Bar of the State- of New
York and the United States Supreme Court.
1 228 U.S. 243; 33 S.Ct. 449, 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913).
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of unity avoids the confusion that arises when there is emphasis on a case, however
close on the facts, which may be quite foreign when the functional requirements
of the law are considered.
All trials are enquiries. It is necessary to define what the scope of the enquiry
is to be. We may say that we will not go into the declarations of absent persons
who have admitted that they committed the crime that is the subject of the enquiry.
We may say that we will not enquire respecting the self-serving declarations of
interested parties. In fixing such boundaries we are limiting the scope of the
enquiry regardless of the grounds on which we justify our course. The limitation
may rest on a desire to keep fact finding within the scope of legal thought, or on a
2
weighing of values in relation to circumstances. In Donnelly v. United States,
Justice Holmes related the enquiry to experience, logic, and common sense. He
stated that the law of evidence is less controlled by history than substantive law.
Justice Holmes looked upon the enquiry as a flexible form varying as the 'experience of society changes. Common sense covers a broad field of man's activity:
it includes those intuitions that are the overflow of experience and which we
call judgment. Common sense includes also a forward looking thought that reaches
beyond the expediency of the moment. To that part of experience Justice Holmes
gave a dramatic emphasis in defining the enquiry by constitutional limitation. The
dissent in Olmstead v. United States" raised in respect to wire tapping a moral doubt.
Two opinions by Justice Holmes relate to the scope of the enquiry.
The first is Donnelly v. United States.4 There the appellant had been convicted
of murder within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. As a part of the defense
testimony was offered that one Dick, now dead, had confessed that he committed
the murder. The trial court excluded the evidence. The Supreme Court sustained
the ruling on the ground that declarations against pecuniary interest only were
admissible within the hearsay rule.
Justice Holmes in his dissent stated that it would be necessary to prove that
the confession was really made and that there was no connection between the defendant and Dick. He pointed out that there was nothing so much against interest as a confession of murder, and that dying declarations are admissible. The
evidence would have a strong tendency to make any one believe that the defendant
did not commit the crime. It "commonly would have much weight."
Wigmore had already shown that much of the case law relied upon to exclude
such evidence could be distinguished on the basis of special circumstances. 5 The
Model Code of Evidence adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute,
published in 1942, provides that declarations which subject a person to civil or
criminal liability are admissible thus broadening the rule beyond the pecuniary
2

n. 1.

8 277

U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928).
4 n. 1.
5

Wigmore, Sec. 1476.
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interest limitation that the majority applied in Donnelly v. United States. Rule 509
(1) of the Model Code of Evidence states as follows:
"A declaration is against the interest of a declarant if the judge finds
that the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time of the declaration
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far
subjected him to civil or criminal liability or so far rendered invalid a
claim by him against an other or created such risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval in the community that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless
he believed it to be true."
In the illustrations of the rule is the following:
"(4) At a trial of D for murder of X, W offers to testify for D
that M confessed that he, M, alone did the killing without the knowledge
or assistance of any other person. Admissible."
The other opinion of Justice Holmes' which relates to the scope of the ellquiry is found in Leach and Co. v. Pierson.6 The action was upon an alleged agreement to repurchase at any time, at the purchase price, bonds that the defendant
sold to the plaintiff. Th-e promise was alleged to have been made by one of defendant's sales agents. The agent's authority was denied. About two months
after the sale the plaintiff had written a letter reciting the agreement and requesting repurchase. The trial court let the letter in evidence, and instructed the jury
that if the petitioner received the letter and failed to disaffirm the transaction as
claimed there would be grounds to find that the petitioner had acquiesced in the
agreement, and that the agent had authority to make it. Justice Holmes, writing
for reversal, held that a man could not make evidence for himself by writing
letters containing statements that he wished to prove; he could not impose a duty
to answer a charge, and a failure to answer, in the absence of circumstances making
an answer requisite or natural, did not have the effect of an admission. The decision
has been the subject of criticism. The point is covered by the Model Code of Evidence which vests a discretion in the trial judge to admit such evidence if a finding
of adoption is warranted or an inference justified that the party believed the
.tatem'ent to be true. Rule 507 provides:
"Evidence of a hearsay statement is admissible against a party to the
action if the judge finds that
(B) The party with knowledge of the content of the statement by
words or other conduct manifested his adoption or approval of the statement or his belief in its truth."
In Leach and Co. v. Pierson,7 Justice Holmes' decision may have rested upon
an order of proof. No contract was established until there was some evidence of the
agent's authority. The letter had no bearing on that point. It was not inconsistent
with an unauthorized contract by the agent upon which the petitioner had no lia6 275 U.S. 120, 48 S.Ct. 57, 72 L.Ed. 194 (1927).
7 n. 1.
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bility. The decision may rest within the rule of the Model Code of Evidence which
extends the scope of the enquiry to matters that the trial judge finds indicate adoption or manifestation of a belief in the truth of the other party's statements. Justice
Holmes made allowance for "circumstances making an answer requisite or n1atural."
The scope of the enquiry has a limitation, over and above the rules of evidence
developed by the common law, a limitation arising by reason of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The former forbidding unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the latter forbidding the compelling of a person in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. Justice Holmes wrote opinions respecting
both of these limitations.
The effort to overcome the reaction against prohibition left Justice Holmes
with a moral doubt. This doubt occurs in a dissent in which Justice Holmes admits he
cannot say that the result reached is contrary to the Amendments.
Since economic change tends now to sweep away civil rights there is an
interest today in opinions such as these. A police state is not consistent with constitutional liberty. These opinions are a philosophy and a guide to peoples who are
striving to retain privacy, personal security, and property, and so relate them to
economic security that the political liberty of the past may be preserved.
In Hester v. United States, 8 there was an indictment for concealing distilled
spirits in violation of a Federal Statute. Revenue officers were allowed to testify
that they had driven near to the house of the defendant's father and concealed
themselves. They saw bottles exchanged outside the house, and they saw the defendant seize a jug from a car and run. The jug, broken in the flight, and a bottle,
were taken and found to contain moonshine whiskey. One officer entered the house
and found nothing but on leaving found outside a jar containing whiskey. The
officers did not have a warrant for a search. The point upon the appeal from a
conviction concerned the admissibility of this evidence. Justice Holmes noted that
the evidence concerned admissions and the only point which touched the Fourth
Amendment was the examination of the bottle, jug and jar on the land of the
defendant's father. There was a distinction in the common law between a house
and open fields and the Amendment allowed for it.
In Burdeau v. McDowell,9 grand jury proceedings were in progress respecting fraudulent use of the mails. The petitioner had sought an order from the Ditrict Court for the return of books, papers and memoranda which had been stolen
from a safe in the petitioner's private office by individuals not identified with
the Government. The papers had been subsequently turned over to the United
States District Attorney. The majority held that the papers had come into the
government's possession without a violation of petitioner's rights. Justice Holmes
8 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 LEd. 898 (1924).

9 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921).
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joined in the dissent which went on the ground that title to the papers was still
in the petitioner.
In SilverthorneLumber Co. v. United States,10 the Court had before it a judgment for contempt issued by a District Court. The appellant was a corporation and
some of its officers had been indicted for violation of a Federal statute. Representatives of the government had gone to the office of the corporation and without
authority "made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there"
(p. 390). An application was made to the District Court for a return of the material
thus taken. The petition was granted. Copies of the papers had been made however and a later indictment was based upon this knowledge. A subpoena was issued
for the originals and upon failure to comply the order of contempt was issued.
Justice Holmes held that the Fourth Amendment extended not only to the physical
possession of the papers but to any advantage gained by doing the forbidden act.
Thu Fourth Amendment was not a form of words.
In Olmstead v. United States," there had been a conviction for a conspiracy
to violate the National Prohibition Act by unlawfully importing liquor from abroad
into the state of Washington. The information leading to the discovery of the conspiracy was obtained by intercepting telephone messages. Notes were taken and
testimony was given on the trial. The objection made became the issue when the
cases were reviewed by thu Supreme Court. The majority limited the Amendment
to "persons, houses, papers and effects" and declined to apply "searches and
seizures" to the act of listening and hearing. The inclusion within the prohibition
of telephone conversations was left to Congressional legislation. Justice Holmes,
dissenting, wrote (p. 469) that he could not say that the penumbraof the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments covered the defendants. There were two objets of desire, criminals should be detected, the Government should not play an ignoble part. Neither prosecutor nor judge should have a hand in "dirty business" (p. 470). If evidence
obtained by violating the Constitution is excluded under the established code,
evidence obtained by violating state law, as was the case here, should be excluded
also.
In 1934 Congress passed legislation forbidding the unauthorized publication
or use of communications by wire or radio. This legislation is now found in Title
47 U. S. C. A. Sec. 605, 48 Stat. 1103, 1934.
The case history of the statute on intercepted messages contains many references
to the opinions of Justice Holmes. In Nardone v. United States,'2 thu Supreme
Court of the United States held that the statute barred as evidence messages that
federal agents had interecepted and which were later offered in support of an in10 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). In United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694,
64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944), Justice Murphy, writing for the court, held that an officer
of the union had no privilege against the production of the books and records of the union since
the Fifth Amendment created a privilege that applied to natural persons only.
11 n. 3.
12

302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937).
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dictment for smuggling alcohol. A new trial was granted. At the second trial the
defendant sought to enquire as to the use made of the evidence that the Supreme
Court of the United States had held to have been illegally obtain'ed. The trial court
denied the motion. On a second appeal the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the enquiry should have been allowed since information obtained by the
government's wrong could not be used. i" There we have an application of the
4
view that Justice Holmes had taken in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.'
The Silverthorne case was distinguished however in United States v. Wallace and
Tiernan Co.'" A subpoena had brought before a grand jury documents and papers
in a criminal proceeding under the Sherman Act. Later, because women had been
excluded from the grand jury, the court dismissed the indictment and directed the
return of the documents and papers. There was a civil proceeding later and a subpoena issued for the production of the documents and papers. The Supreme Court
of the United States sustained the subpoena on the ground that the documents and
papers had been obtained in the first instance by judicial process. How would
Justice Holmes have applied there the point on which he dissented in Burdeau v.
McDonald,i5 namely, that title to the documents and papers was still in the defendant? The antithesis appears in Davis v. United States' 7 where ration coupons
were held to be public property. The view of the majority in Olmstead v. United
States,'5 rather than Justice Holmes' dissent in that case, prevailed in Goldman v.
United States.19 A detectaphone was placed in an adjoining room to overhear
telephone conversations that the defendant had from his own room. The use of
the detectaphone was not barred by the statute. Co-conspirators, who confessed
when confronted with intercepted messages, were held in Goldstein v. United
States 20 to be proper witnesses against the other conspirators. The Goldman2' and
Goldstein2 2 cases and WJolf v. Colorado,23 which held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not place a similar restraint on the states, go to the farthest point that
justice Holmes' view could extend. In the Silverthorne Lumber Co.2 4 case, Justice
Holmes pointed out that corporations had the benefit of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court of the United States accepted that view in Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling2' but held that the Amendment guarded the corporation
only against abuses of indefiniteness or of scope in a subpoena. Justice Frankfurter
has made a through going note of the recent cases concerning seizure in con13

308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).

14 n. 10.

15 336 U.S.
16 n. 9.
'7
328 U.S.
18 n. 3.
19 316 U.S.
20 316 U.S.
21 n. 19.
22 n.

793, 69 S.Ct. 824, 93 L.Ed. 1042 (1949).
582, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946).
129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 LEd. 1322 (1942).
114, 62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 LEd. 1312 (1942).

20.

28 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949).
24 n. 10.
25 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946).
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nection with arrest in the dissenting opinion in Harris v. United States.2 6 Many of
these case refer to the opinions of Justice Holmes that I have discussed here. The
Harris27 case, although it concerns seizure in reference to arrest, is of interest here
because there Justice Jackson in a dissenting opinion brings back to us the moral
28
doubt that Justice Holmes had raised in Olmstead v. United States:
"Of course, this, like each of our constitutional guaranties, often
may afford a shelter for criminals. But the forefathers thought this was
not too great a price to pay for that decent privacy of home, papers and
effects which is indispensable to individual dignity and self-respect. They
may have overvalued privacy, but I am not disposed to set their command
at naught."
Justice Holmes by admitting in evidence declarations of the commission
of a crime extended the field of the enquiry. There his thought rested
on the application of logic and experience. Respecting self serving declarations
Justice Holmes did not give the scope to the enquiry that current thought allows.
We broaden the enquiry now by a more thorough study of the circumstances. Justice
Holmes rested there on logic and experience in matters of self interest. The current
thought meets that point through a more extended enquiry by the trial court. In
the field of constitutional limitations Justice Holmes was prepared to exclude from
the enquiry evidence that was subject to a doubt under the larger import of the
words used in the Constitution. Thus in the detection of crime Justice Holmes resolved the dilemma created by the desire to catch the criminal and the means used for
that purpose by reference to the rights of privacy, security, and property that were
the affirmative purposes of the Constitution. This view prevailed later by a statutory
change. Justice Holmes added thereby to the tests of experience, logic and common
sense that he had stated in Donnelly v. United States a further test that rests on a
moral doubt, a doubt that arises from the basic constitutional purpose. This doubt
might be expressed in the homely metaphor that you may not eat your cake and
have it.
We turn now to the opinions of Justice Holmes dealing with presumptions. We
shall first examine those relating to issues of fact; then those opinions relating o
how far a statute may create a presumption consistent with due process of law under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Chief Justice Stone stated in Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank
Barge Corp.29 that the word "presumption" is an equivocal term. Justice Holmes
contributed much to the thought in this field of law. (1) He related the presumption rule to procedure, and he separated it from the field of evidence. (2)
He separated the process of assuming a fact from the evickntual value of the
26 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947). See: United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
72 S.C. 93, 96 L.E. 53 (1951).
27 n. 26.
428n. 3.
29 314 U.S. 104, 62 S.Ct. 156, 86 L.Ed. 89 (1941).
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common experience of life. (3) He distinguished between presumptions and thL
burden of proof. (4) He distinguished presumptions from rules of substantive law.
These clarifications in the field of procedure are valuabl econtributions which
Justice Holmes made to judicial thinking. The procedural part of justice is in
itself of fundamental importance to society. Contributions there are as helpful
as those made in the fields of substantive law and constitutional thought. If justice
is to be attained, the procedures of the law must be definite. This is especially so
where there is a division of work between the court and a jury. The issues of fact
must be clearly placed before a jury. The material that a jury may use in reaching
a conclusion should be identified.
(A) Presumptionsin Relation to Procedure
In Battle v. United States8 o there had been a conviction in the District Court
on an indictment for murder. A charge concerning sanity had been requested and
refused. There was a shadow of evidence that the defendant was of unsound mind.
The court charged that the burden of proof was on the Government to prove facts
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury were to consider all of the evidence.
Holmes wrote that in the circumstances no more could be asked. He pointed out
that until evidence is given on the other side the burden of proof is satisfied by a
presumption arising from the fact that most men are sane. (p. 38). The important
words in Holmes' statement of the law are "until evidence is given on the other
side the burden of proof is satisfied by a presumption *** "
The Model Code of Etidence makes the following statement in Rule 704
relating to the effect of presumptions:
"Rule 704. Effect of presumptions.
(1) Subject to Rule 703, when the basic fact of a presumption has
been established in an action, the existence of the presumed fact must be
assumed unless and until evidence has been introduced which would
support a finding )f its non-existence or the basic fact of an inconsistent
presumption has been established.
(2)

Subject to Rule 703, when the basic fact of a presumption has

been established in an action and evidence has been introduced which
would support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact or the
basic fact of an inconsistent presumption has been established, the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact is to be determined exactly as
if no presumption had ever been applicable in the action."
The comment on Rule 704 contains the following statement respecting cases
where the basic fact has sufficient value as evidence of the presumed fact to support a finding:
(Page 317)
"B. When the basic fact has to be established by the jury, upon evidence, then,
80 209 U. S. 36, 28 S.Ct. 422, 52 L.Ed. 670 (1908).
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(1) If there is no evidence justifying a finding contrary to the pre-

sumed fact, the judge instructs the jury that if the basic fact is established, then the presumed fact must be taken as true; but
(2) If there is evidence justifying a finding contrary to the presumed fact, the judge says nothing about a presumption, but leaves the jury
to find the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact exactly as if
the presumption had never had any effect in the action."
(B) Presumtions Based Upon Common Experience

In Greer v. United States"l there had been a conviction for introducing whiskey
from without the state into that part of Oklahoma that formerly was within
the Indian Territory. The trial court had been asked to instruct the jury that the
defendant was presumed to b'e a person of good character and that the presumption should be considered as evidence in favor of the accused. This was refused
and the trial court gave the usual charge that the defendant was presumed to be
innocent of the crime until guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Holmes in sustaining the trial court wrote that the character of the defendant was a matter of fact which, if investigated, might turn out either way. The
Government could not introduce this issue and the defendant's character coul dnot
become an issue in the case unless the defendant chose to make it an issue. Holmes
went on to write that presumption upon a matter of fact meant that common experience shows the fact to be generally true. He further pointed out that the term
"presumption of fact" is often a disguise for some other principle of law. (p. 561).
The only possible justification for the use of a presumption is that the fact we
presume arises from common experience. In Greer v. United States,82 Justice
Holmes disposed of the matter by the statement that there is no presumption
that persons indicted by a Grand Jury are of good character.
The point which Justice Holmes brought out in Greer v. United States 3 is
illustrated by cases where the fact is one resting within common experience.
Wellisch v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.8 4 is an illustration. There was an

issue as to the insured's death by accident or suicide. The insured died from
an over-dos'e of seconal. The issue was whether he took the extra capsules by mistake or with an intention of killing himself. He was found in a comatose condition
sitting in his automobile which had left the highway and crashed into a tree.
There was conflicting evidence and inference. The action was upon a life policy
and not an accident policy. Suicide was a defense with the burden of proof resting
upon the insurer. Presumption as procedure had been properly eliminated by the
trial court in its charge to the jury. The beneficiary had a verdict which was affirmed
by the Appellate Division on the ground that the verdict was not against the weight
of the evidence. The only issue open in the Court of Appeals was whether there was
any 'evidence to sustain the findings below. The Court of Appeals could not re1 245 U.S. 559, 38 S.Ct. 209, 62 L.Ed. 469 (1918).
82 n. 31.
S n. 31.
84 293 N.Y. 178, 56 N.E.2d 540 (1944).
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weigh the evidence. The presumption against suicide was held to be an evidential
fact-"judicial recognition of what is probable." (p. 184). The presumption is
here treated not as a presumption but as a fact. There was therefore no question
of law left for review after the jury's verdict which had been affirmed on the
facts by the Apellate Division. The decision rests on jurisdictional ground. It does
not disturb the presumption rules.
(C) Presumptions and the Burden of Proof
In Tinker v. Midland Valley Mercantile Co., 35 the action wvas upon a promissory note that an Osage Indian residing on the reservation had given. The note
was in the sum of $922.50. A Federal statute made it unlawful for traders upon
the reservation to give credit to any individual Indian, head of a family, in an
amount greater than seventy-five per centum of the next quarterly annuity payment to which such an Indian was entitled. The answer alleged a violation of the
statute. The evidence showed that the defendant's total quarterly payment would
be $322. There was no evidence as to when the credits were given. Plaintiff's
demurrer to the evidence was sustained in the lower court which held that the
burden of proof was on the defendant as in the case of illegal consideration.
Justice Holmes, writing the opinion for reversal, held that the nature of the statute
was such as to put the duty of bringing the claim within the statute on the plaintiff.
The duty to plead the defense may have rested on the defendant. This is a matter
of convenience, however, and the order of pleading does not always determine
the burden of proof. Here the burden was on the plaintiff. Justice Holmes refers
by analogy to the rule that the payee of a promissory note need not allege a consideration but if there is conflicting evidence he has the burden of proof.
A recent case illustrates the rule that presumptions do not change the burden
of proof. In CommercialMolasses Corp. v. New York Barge Corp.86 a bailee, which
was not an insurer, gave evidence which repelled the suggestion that a barge had
sunk because of unseaworthiness-a presumption which arises in unexplained sinkings. Upon all of the evidence the trial court was left in doubt as to the cause of the

accident. Since the presumption was one of procedure only and had been met it
was held that the issue must be resolved under the rule respecting the burden
of proof and the bailor had not met the burden of proof in view of the finding
of the lower court that it was in doubt as to the cause of the sinking.
(D) Presumptions as Rules of Substantive Law
In Schlesinger v. Wisconsin37 a state statute directed that all gifts of a material part of a decedant's estate within six years of death be deemed made in
85 231 U.S. 681, 34 S.Ct. 252, 58 L.Ed. 434 (1914).
86 n. 29.

87 270 U.S. 230, 46 S.Ct. 260, 70 L.Ed. 557 (1926). "An irrebuttable presumption" may be a
rule of substantive law. In agency the rule that notice shall be imputed to the principal and the
principal charged with the agent's knowledge of matters within the scope of the employment is
often described as an "irrebuttable presumption" Bowen v. Mt. Vernon Savings Bank, 105 F.2d
796, CCA, D.C. (1939).
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contemplation of death and be subject to graduated inheritance taxes. The majority
of the court held that the statute created an arbitrary classification which was
beyond the state's power under the due process clause of th'e Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Holmes dissenting, treated the "absolute presumption" (p. 241)
as a rule of substantive law. A state legislature could constitutionally tax such
transfers upon proper classification. The statute was therefore a rule of tax law
and not a presumption in the sense that word is generally used. This point comes
out even clearer in the dissent in Heiner v. Donnan,3 8 a case decided after Justice
Holmes' time in the court. Thete Sec. 302 (c) of the Federal Revenue Act of 1926
created a conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years prior to the
death of the donor were made in contemplation of death and requqired such gifts to
be included in computing the value of the taxable estate of a decedent. The majority
held the provision of the statute invalid und'er the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Justice Stone developed the point in his dissent that tax statutes were
involved. The statement in th'e second paragraph on page 335 is a declaration
that a rule of substantive law and not a presumption is involved in the decision.
Schlesinger v. Wisconsin39 shows that there are limitations upon the presumption that a statute may create and which may b-e treated as evidence. The Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments thus limit the scope of the inquiry. In defining the
nermissible inference that became evidence by reason of a presumption, Justice
Holmes distinguished between that which is reasonable and that which is arbitrarv in 'experience, logic and common sense. This may be expressed by saying
that there must be reasonable connection between the fact proved and the fact
assumed. Such was the standard that justice Holmes followed in the field of
-evidence. In the field of Constitutional law. and for the purpose of defining what
presumptions are permissible under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Justice
Holmes applied the same standard as in the field of evidence, namely, the reasonable connection between the fact proved and the fact that the statute permitted to be
inferred from the fact proved, using experience, logic and common sens'e as the
criteria.
In McFarlandv. American Sugar Co. 40 a Louisiana statute concerning monopolies was before the court. It contained these provisions among others: that a
person engaged in refining sugar in the state who systematically paid a price for
sugar less than he paid in any other state be presumed a party to a conspiracy in
restraint of trade; that a refinery kept idle for more than a year be presumed to
have been kept idle for the purpose of violating the laws against monopoly; that
books, letters and other documents or apparent copies establish the facts carried
on teir face unless sufficiently rebutted, if possession or control was found to be
in a defendant; that the report of any legislative committee of the state or of Con285 U. S. 312, 52 S.Ct. 358, 76 L.Ed. 772 (1932).
37.
40 241 U.S. 79, 36 S.Ct. 498, 60 L.Ed. 899 (1916).
38

39 n.
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gress or any bureau, department, or commmission acting under their authority
be primae facie evidence of the facts set fourth, subject to rebuttal. Justice Holmes,
writing for the court held that the principal presumption that the statute created
had no relation to fact and was without foundation except with tacit reference to the
plaintiff who was suing in 'equity to restrain the enforcement of the statute. This
case smacks of discrimination and raises issue under the equal protection as well
as the process clause.
In Ferry v. Ramsey4 ' a Kansas statute made it unlawful for a director of a
hank to assent to the receipt of deposits by the bank after he had knowledge of
the fact that the bank was insolvent. The statute made it the duty of a director
.-o examine the affairs of a bank, to know its condition, and upon failure to do so
a director was presumed to have had knowledge of insolvency and made "individually responsible for such deposit so received." The statute then went on to make
the fact that the bank was insolvent, or in failing circumstances, at the time of
the reception of a deposit primae facie evidence of knowledge and an assent to the
deposit. Depositors had recovered their losses from directors in actions in the state
courts. The issue before "he Supreme Court was the validity of the presumption. One
of the defendants was the executor of a director who was seriously ill at the
time the deposit was made and who had since died. Justice Holmes was of the
opinion that the presumption rule was not involved. He pointed out that the state
could make the directors personally liable for deposits; and an acceptance of the
office was an acceptance of the risk. This is an instance where the substantive
law became controlling.
We turn now to two cases that arose under the Federal Statutes concerning
the possession of opium.
In United States v. fin Fuey Moy 42 the question involved was in essence one
of statutory construction. Justice Holmes avoided the issue that the statutory presumption might have created under the Fifth Amendment by construction of the
statute. The defendant had been indicted under the Federal Narcotics Act 48 for issuing a written prescription in bad faith to one Martin and for the purpose of supplying opium to a person addicted to its use. The indictment connected the defendant by an allegation of conspiracy to put opium in Martin's possession in violation
of the sect-on of the statute forbidding the possession of opium by unregistered persons. Martin was not registered. Section 8 of the statute made it unlawful for
"any person" not registered to have in his possession any of the drugs covered
by the statute. The Government argued that this section included all persons and
made possession in itself unlawful. Justice Holmes pointed out that if the statute
41 277 U.S. 88, 48 S.Ct. 443, 72 L.Ed. 796 (1928).
42 241 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 658, 60 L.Ed. 1061 (1916). In Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct. Los
Angeles Cty., Calif., 248 U.S. 8, 52 S.Ct. 103, 76 L.Ed. 136 (1931), a provision in a statute that
"the blowing release or escape of natural gas into the air shall be prima facie evidence of unreasonable waste" was held valid.
43 38 Star. 785 and 789 (1914), 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 3224.
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were so construed the statute would make possession prima facie a criminal act;
and since the statute contemplated that production of opium was taking place
in the United States the court could not assume that Congress had made possession
illegal. Justice Holmes refused, therefore, to give Section 8 the construction that
the Government urged and he limited Section 8 so that it referred to persons who
were clearly required to register under Section 1 of the statute, namely, producers,
importers, manufacturers and compounders.
This opinion must be read with the opinion that Justice Holmes wrote in
Casey v. United States.4 4 The Federal Narcotics Act had been amended since the
earlier case. 4 The indictment in the Casey case rested on a count for purchasing
opium otherwise than in the original stamped package. The defendant's conviction
rested upon a purchase; there was no direct evidence of a purchase; the Government
relied upon a presumption that the statute created. The statute provided that
the absence of the required stamps from the drug "shall be prima facie evidence of
a violation of this section by the person in whose possession same may b'e found."
Justice Holmes held that the possession of the drug that manifestly had not been
produced by the possessor was reasonably connected with the purchase of the
drug. He pointed out that here the presumption had nothing to do with evidence
and that it related to the burden of proof and that under circumstances such as
these the burden of explanation and justification could be put upon the possessor.
Three recent cases in the Supreme Court of the United States illustrate the
points that Justice Holmes made in the cases under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In Tot v. United States' 6 the defendant had been convicted under
the Federal Firearms Act. 47 There was evidence that the defendant had previously
been convicted of crime in the state courts and that on September 22, 1938 he was
found in possession of a loaded automatic pistol. There was evidence that the pistol
had been made in Connecticut in 1919 and that the maker had shipped it to Chicago. The defendant had presented evidence of a purchase of the pistol in 1933
or 1934. The statute in Section (2) provided that the prior conviction and present
possession of the firearm created a presumption that the firearm had been received
m interstate or foreign commerce and that the receipt occurred after July 30, 1938,
the effective date of the statute. The court held that there was no rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed; and that the statute could not
be justified as a proper shifting of the burden of proof since the jury would be
left free to act on the presumption alone.
Bollenbach v. United States48 discusses the presumption that a court may make
from a given state of facts, namely, the possession of stolen property shortly after
276 U.S. 413, 48 S.Ct. 373, 72 L.Ed. 632 (1928).
45 40 Stat. 1057, 1130, 1131, 1919; 26 U.S.C.A. sec. 2553.
46 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943). In Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82,
54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664 (1934), a presumption in respect to race was held invalid.
47 52 Stat. 1250, 1938; 15 U.S.C.A. sec. 902 (f).
48 326 U.S. 607, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946).
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it had been stolen in another state. The defendant had been convicted under the
National Stolen Property Act. He had helped to dispose in New York of securities
that had been stolen in Minneapolis. The trial court charged that the possession
of the stolen property in New York shortly after the theft raised the presumption
that the possessor was the thief and had transported the property in interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the presumption suggested was not a fair summary of 'experience. The fact that the defendant might
have been an accessory-after-the- fact weakened the presumption further.
In United States v. Fleischman4'9 there is an application of the burden ot
proof rule that Justice Holmes had distinguished from presumption in Case) v
United States.50 A Congressional committee had subpoenaed the defendant and
others to produce certain organization records. The records were not produced.
There was an indictment for wilful default. On appeal from the conviction it wa.
argued that the Government had not gone far enough in its proof: the defendant
may have adopted the position that she did after she had tried in good faith to bring
about compliance with the subpoena. The court held that the Government was
riot obliged to present positive evidence in respect to circumstances that were
fairly established by other circumstances since the defendant could disprove any
of the inferred circumstances by evidence within the defendant's possession or control. The facts were peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. The court pointed
out that the defendant did not thereby lose the presumption of innocence and that
presumption continued to operate until guilt was established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In Bollenbach v. United States5 and United States v. Fleischman52 there were
dissenting opinions. In Tot v. United States53 there was a concurring opinion that
rested on the ground that the presumption created by the statute was invalid and
the opinion refused to consider the point respecting the burden of proof. These
three cases show that the application of the provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to presumptions created by a statute and to a statute that shifts the
burden of explanation is not always free from doubt. Justice Holmes developed
the basic principles by distinguishing between presumptions and burden of explanation. The analytical work that he did there clarified the principles of law
and made the task of applying the Amendments to cases of this kind easier. The
339 U.S. 349, 70 S.Ct. 739, 94 L.Ed. 906 (1950). In Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Ford, 287 U.S.
502, 53 S.Ct. 249, 77 L.Ed. 457 (1933), a statute raising a presumption of a failure to give
prescribed warning signals at a railroad crossing that amounted to a mere temporary inference
was held valid. In Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U.S. 123, 55 S.Ct. 732, 79 L.Ed. 1343, (1935), a
Treasury regulation in respect to gains from the sale of corporate shares that charged sales against
the earliest purchase was held valid. In Rossi v. U. S., 289 U.S. 89, 53 S.Ct. 532, 77 L.Ed. 1051
(1933), a presumption in a Federal statute that the operation of a still in a dwelling house was
evidence of a failure to register and give a bond was held valid.
50 n. 44.
61 n. 48.
52 n. 49.
53 n. 46.
49
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inference from an established fact, the burden of proof, and the rule of subst antive
law were separated out from the general word "presumption" and thereby a term
of the law that had very little denotative force became a definite form. The principles of law that were being applied became clear. The work of application of
course remained.
Justice Holmes reasons from the facts of the case that the court is deciding.
He never generalizes or uses abstractions. Phrases have no place in his thought.
There is a reference to the fundamentals of the law when that is necessary.
Justice Holmes' habit of approaching the law through the facts has a special
interest. The political thought of the 'era in which Justice Holmes lived was
given to generalizations, a trait that continues into the present. Science and tecnnology were in the meantime developing in leaps and bounds by experiment and
with an enquiring attitude. Justice Holmes was influenced by this development.
In his legal work he proceeded from the facts. He insisted upon a clearly defined
thought. We have had an example of this in discussing presumptions. There
Justice Holmes' work changed a generality into a principle of law that had a functional use.
Justice Holmes approached the law of evidence in the terms of life which
he defined as experience, logic, and good sense. The experience that Justice Holmes
had in mind was based on an observation of life. His own observation of life
had been close enough so that his work was influenced by the industrial and
technological development of the time. W'e have supplemented this direct observation that Justice Holmes described as experience by psychology, a science that in
Justice Holmes' time was in its beginnings, but in the hands of men who were
to place it upon a foundation where it would later become important.
Justice Holmes' approach to the law over the facts was supplemented by an
intuitive power in applying legal principles to facts. Thus, his work was characterized
by a penetrating, analytical power. Referring again to presumptions, we find
Justice Holmes distinguishing sharply between questions of law and questions of
fact and separating facts that might be assumed from the rule respecting the
burden of proof. Justice Holmes carried into the constitutional questions the same
responsiveness to life that he had used in the law of evidence. He applied the same
test: the reasonable relations and connections that life itself made probable.

